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BOOK REVIEW 
PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED SUICIDE (Medical Ethics Series). Edited by 
Robert F. Weir. Bloomington: Indiana U Press, 1997. Pp. 304. 
$29.95. ISBN: 0253332826. 
Is assistance in suicide a fundamental constitutional right? Should 
physician-assisted suicide (PAS) be legalized? These two questions 
have galvanized the debate over PAS for the past decade. They likewise 
shape the essays in this volume. It is perhaps unfortunate that these 
questions were answered, the second at least provisionally, in the same 
year this volume was published. For 1997 witnessed the landmark 
decisions of the Supreme Court in Washington v Glucksberg, 521 US 
702 (1997), and Vacco v Quill, 521 US 793 (1997), as well as the 
implementation of the equally historic Oregon Death with Dignity Act 
(Measure 16). One wonders how the distinguished scholars gathered 
here might have engaged these developments in their essays. 
Nonetheless, this volume provides valuable historical background 
and penetratingly analyzes conceptual, legal, and policy issues at stake 
with PAS. For legal scholars, it provides valuable models for 
interpreting legal decisions and public policy. Remarkable for their 
clarity, these essays are equally accessible to students or thoughtful 
citizens truly interested in how to think about and respond to PAS. 
It is a credit to Robert Weir that he could produce a book like this. 
For he has collected a set of compelling arguments against his own 
position. Elsewhere, Weir has argued that PAS ought to be 
decriminalized.1 His preface that introduces the essays clearly reflects 
this position. The preface leaves one with the impression that consensus 
favoring PAS is building and that legalization is only a matter of time. 
It was surprising, then, to find that among the ten authors (two 
marshaled for each section), only three clearly support PAS. While the 
"reasonable persons" on this panel certainly disagree, those who oppose 
PAS advance better arguments and are able to mount more careful, 
cogent and persuasive cases. 
Both essays in Part One, Historical Interpretation, provide 
1. Robert F. Weir, The Morality of Physician Assisted Suicide, Law, Medicine, & Health 
Care 20 (1992). 
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important contextualizing background. Readers will find themselves 
reading and interpreting later authors' claims in light of the narratives 
and accounts presented here. The book could not have begun with a 
better essay than Darrel W. Amundsen's, the only one in the book to 
deal in any way with religion. Two discrete objectives shape 
Amundsen's project. First, he highlights the complex issue of how 
historical warrants ought to be deployed in developing legal opinion. 
Anyone charged with writing legal decisions would profit from this 
piece. Second, Amundsen is clearly vexed. And he should be. The 
problem is identified in the title of his essay: The Significance of 
Inaccurate History in Legal Considerations of Physician Assisted 
Suicide. In order to undermine the challenge presented by Christian 
convictions, PAS advocates have engaged what can at best be labeled 
"revisionist history," but more accurately is simply incompetent and 
irresponsible scholarship. By distorting the historical corpus, 
inexcusably conflating martyrdom and suicide, anachronistically 
applying contemporary concepts to antiquity, and lacking basic socio- 
historical methods, such advocates have re-narrated early Christianity as 
either open to or actively encouraging suicide. 
More importantly, bad scholarship has legs, especially bad 
scholarship that serves a public agenda. Trumpeted within media 
campaigns, such conclusions come to be believed by the general public. 
And they wend their way into centers of influence. Amundsen offers the 
example of Michigan Circuit Court Judge Kaufman's 1993 "Opinion 
and Order Concerning the Constitutionality of the Michigan Statute 
Proscribing Assisted Suicide." He pulls no punches in criticizing 
Kaufman's account. But he reserves his most scathing critique for a 
theologian and a patristic scholar, Arthur J. Droge and James D. Tabor, 
for their recent book, A Noble Death: Suicide and Martyrdom among 
Christians and Jews in Antiquity (Harper, 1992). Amundsen charges 
them with "faddish linguistic deconstructionism and historical 
revisionism that are blatantly anachronistic and do violence to the texts." 
(10)2 Amundsen retrieves significant early Christian texts carefully, 
precisely, and systematically.3 He ably refutes the claim that most 
Christian martyrs actually volunteered or took their own lives. He traces 
patristic commentary on suicide. And he demolishes the conflation 
between martyrdom and suicide. 
Harold Y. Vanderpool locates the contemporary PAS debate within 
2. All citations in the text refer to the book under review. 
3. For a more developed account, highly recommended, see Edward J. Larson & Darrel W. 
Amundsen, A Different Death: Euthanasia and the Christian Tradition (InterVarsity Press, 1998). 
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the history of American physicians' "traditions" of thought, advocacy 
and practice vis-a-vis the dying of their patients. He begins with the 
1847 AMA Code of Ethics, which first codified physician's 
responsibilities to dying patients, enjoining them to attend at the 
bedside, administer therapeutics and serve as "ministers of hope and 
comfort to the sick." Although medicalization of dying begins to 
emerge even within this phase, a shift occurs as the century progresses, 
propelled by technological developments-the invention of the 
hypodermic and advances in analgesics. In 1873, a new variable enters 
the picture, namely, a proposal from England advocating euthanasia. In 
Vanderpool's account, the debate over euthanasia was striking in a key 
regard: the arguments advanced, for and against euthanasia, are 
remarkably contemporary. All warrants asserted today regarding PAS- 
save autonomy-merely echo turn-of-the-century arguments. 
Vanderpool's narrative recounts how dying became an object of 
control, with physicians centralizing control through the hospitalization 
of dying until the 1970s when movements for patient-control over 
medicalized dying emerged. The contemporary debate continues this 
struggle. Vanderpool comes closer than his colleagues to showing how 
patient attitudes toward end-of-life issues are so deeply constructed by 
technology and culture so as to render the notion of "self-determination" 
a tragic myth. 
Moreover, he shows that it was within a relatively short time 
period-from 1840 to 1950-that an amazing metamorphosis occurred 
in the social ecology of dying. Seen in the 1840s as substantively 
central to one's individual life narrative, the dying process was deemed 
so profoundly important hat "To be present at a friend's, neighbor's, or 
family member's death was looked upon as a 'great' or 'very great 
privilege." (35) By the 1950s dying had become something to be 
avoided. Physicians believed "that patients would be emotionally 
devastated if they discovered that their lives could not be prolonged" 
and "a 'collective mood' developed-the desire not to be present at 
death." (45) Vanderpool's essay demonstrates how contemporary 
attitudes and practices, often invoked as timeless, universal truths, are 
cultural artifacts of relatively recent vintage. 
Part Two explores Ethical Assessments and Positions. Daniel 
Callahan and Dan W. Brock face off over whether or not PAS could 
ever be ethically or morally justifiable. Callahan argues that PAS is 
both intrinsically and consequentially wrong. The prospect of socially 
legitimating PAS through legalization concerns him most. Callahan 
methodically outlines the principal arguments against PAS. The care, 
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precision, and clarity of his analysis is a model of bioethical discourse. 
The arguments he marshals and the critiques he registers will be familiar 
to those acquainted with the PAS debate-that PAS concentrates 
excessive power in the physicians' hands, that it disproportionately 
values individual self-determination over the common good, that the 
Netherlands' experiment evidences that the practice cannot be 
contained, and that PAS would intrinsically alter the medical practice. 
Five points are worth highlighting. Callahan first states a claim 
that recurs throughout he essays, namely that "the distinction between 
euthanasia and PAS is not morally significant." (71) In both cases, the 
physician is causally involved and so is equally culpable. Related to 
this, he notes how fictive the notion of self-determination is; insofar as 
both PAS and euthanasia require another person's assistance, it is "a 
mutual, social decision between two people." (74) Third, legalizing 
PAS would represent a profound turning point in Western culture, by 
creating "one more socially tolerated reason for one person to kill 
another or to assist another to kill herself." (72) This he finds 
incongruous, insofar as on most fronts (for example, the death penalty, 
war), socio-political opinion is beginning to challenge these practices. 
Fourth, Callahan takes on those who would erase the distinction 
between killing and allowing to die. Here Callahan truly advances the 
debate by distinguishing between causality and culpability. Wherein 
lies the error of those who wish to equate a physician removing a 
respirator from a patient dying of ALS with injecting a lethal drug or 
providing a pill? Callahan maintains that in the former case, the cause 
of death would be the underlying disease, whereas in the latter two 
cases, the cause is the pharmacologic agent. In both cases, however, 
culpability can be assigned. One might turn off a respirator without 
consent or for ulterior motives; one might administer a lethal dose 
unintentionally. In both cases, culpability differs, one being held 
culpable for the patients death differently in the former instance than in 
the latter. Thus the error for those who would equate killing and 
allowing to die 
lies in confusing causality and culpability and in failing to note the 
way in which human societies have overlaid natural causes with 
moral rules and interpretations . . .]udgements of moral 
responsibility and culpability are human constructs. .... When 
physicians could do nothing to stop death, they were not held 
responsible for it. When, with medical progress, they began to 
have some power over death .... moral rules were devised to set 
forth their obligations. Natural causes were not thereby banished. 
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They were, instead, overlaid with a medical ethic designed to 
determine moral culpability in deploying medical power. (78-79) 
Finally, Callahan traces self-determination and individual well- 
being to their logical conclusions, demonstrating that once PAS 
instantiates these principles, there will be no logical place, no good 
moral reason, from which to limit euthanasia nd PAS: 
If we really believe in self-determination, then any competent 
person should have a right to be killed by a doctor for any reason 
that suits him and no less to be assisted in suicide. If we believe in 
the relief of suffering, then it seems cruel and capricious to deny it 
to the incompetent. There is, in short, no reasonable or logical 
stopping point once the turn has been made down the road to 
euthanasia or PAS. (83) 
Callahan's conclusion proves prophetic in the next essay, by Dan 
Brock, whose arguments Callahan has just surgically demolished. 
Brock's "central ethical argument" rests on the "two fundamental ethical 
values" of "individual self-determination or autonomy and individual 
well-being." (89) Brock employs these concepts, however, in an 
unnuanced fashion, failing to attend to the manifold ways in which 
"choice" is constrained, coerced and constructed by disease and society. 
Like Callahan, Brock maintains that euthanasia nd PAS are not morally 
distinct, but he takes it one step further. If public policy allows one, 
says Brock, it should admit the other. Warrants that support PAS should 
likewise justify voluntary active euthanasia (VAE). This position, 
paired with his candid expansion of the concept of pain and suffering to 
include "psychological suffering" unrelated to physical pain, only 
proves Callahan's point that it will be impossible to limit socially and 
legally sanctioned PAS. Finally, Brock seeks to equate killing and 
allowing to die, redefining the latter as "ethically justified killing." 
Even without Callahan's compelling re-description of this issue or the 
Supreme Court's reaffirmation of the distinction in its 1997 decisions, 
Brock's own argument is extremely problematic. The examples he 
marshals would strike most people as ethically problematic even if legal, 
such as "when an apparently competent patient makes an informed and 
voluntary choice to refuse life-sustaining treatment that would restore 
the patient to full function and a life that most people would consider a 
life well worth having." (95) 
Other problems plague Brock's essay. I will simply mention a few. 
Brock repeatedly stresses that he is only addressing the moral question 
of individual acts rather than the legal questions surrounding PAS as a 
social practice. Yet he repeatedly turns to policy to warrant his own 
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argument and confuses the legal and the moral. (95-96) He essentially 
limits the moral determinant to autonomy or self-determination, a 
position that conflicts even with common sense. He proclaims as 
timeless truths statements such as: "Individual self-determination has 
special importance in choices about the time and manner of one's death, 
including assisted suicide;" (89) ". . . it is especially important that 
individuals control to the extent possible the manner, circumstances, and 
timing of their dying and death." (90) After reading Vanderpool's 
essay, one can only respond "Since when?" Finally, Brock makes a 
novel move, redefining the "moral center" of medicine as respecting 
patients' self-determination and promoting their well-being. Again this 
is asserted rather than demonstrated. As a "value" of relatively recent 
vintage, patient self-determination deserves a bit longer to mature before 
becoming medicine's moral center. 
Part Three, Medical Practices and Perspectives, turns to physician 
voices. Here Ira R. Byock, M.D. and Howard Brody, MD debate 
whether or not physician-assisted suicide is an acceptable practice for 
physicians. The arguments are, for the most part, familiar, though both 
essays are ably done and worth reading. Byock answers in the negative, 
identifying and challenging assumptions about the medical profession 
underlying the PAS debate. His responses to these assumptions are 
thoughtful, reflecting a seasoned medical practitioner's concrete 
experience. He ultimately concludes that PAS is a call to the medical 
profession for self-reform and national leadership: "the crisis of end-of- 
life care presents an opportunity for the profession of medicine to take 
strong and corrective action and, in so doing, assert a traditional 
leadership role ... it can model for society a caring ethic." (128) 
Howard Brody argues that assistance in patient suicides is an 
acceptable practice for physicians, if the practice is carefully 
circumscribed by oversight and safeguards and made available only to a 
limited patient population. Proceeding carefully and prudentially, Brody 
first advances several arguments supporting PAS and then arguments 
opposing PAS which he deems "also quite weighty." (138) Rather than 
arguing the "pro" side, however, he instead attempts to show why the 
opposing arguments are less compelling than they might first appear. 
These arguments disfavoring PAS include: professional integrity; the 
adequacy of safeguards; the effect of PAS on hospice care; PAS as the 
medicalization of death; and physician incompetence to administer PAS. 
The very statement of these concerns illustrates profound difficulties 
with PAS, and Brody does little to assuage those difficulties. 
His counterarguments are not as compelling as he might wish, for 
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they require significant assumptions. For example, he counters the 
charge that PAS undermines professional integrity by redefining the 
goals of medicine as "healing, preventing illness, and helping the dying 
patient to achieve a peaceful and dignified death." (141, emphasis 
added) So redefined, PAS would not undercut professional integrity. 
Even following Vanderpool's account, however, the redefinition of the 
goal of medicine as one of assisting death is of relatively recent vintage 
and of dubious centrality in the self-understanding of physicians. With 
regard to the effect of PAS on hospice care, Brody proposes an oversight 
mechanism which includes palliative care specialists on a team that 
would determine which patients would be "morally appropriate 
candidates" and recommends that "almost all patients would have to 
undergo a trial of hospice care before being viewed as potential 
candidates" for PAS. The implementation of this proposal would 
require coopting palliative care personnel, requiring them to 
compromise their fundamental principles and to cooperate with evil both 
formally and materially. Practically, then, this proposal seems dubious. 
Part Four examines PAS from the perspective of Potentially 
Vulnerable Patients. An essay by Kristi L. Kirshner, MD, Carol J. Gill 
and Christine K. Cassel, MD, provides little new to readers familiar with 
the debate on PAS. The essay revisits three classic cases of refusal of 
life-sustaining treatment/assisted-suicide by people with disabilities: 
David Rivlin, Larry McAfee, and Elizabeth Bouvia. They conclude, 
aptly, that these cases demonstrate not a desire "to exercise control over 
their bodies and medical treatment, [but] a desire to escape the socially 
constructed part of disability-the pain of prejudice, economic 
deprivation, exclusion from the community, and unnecessarily restricted 
choices." (163) Their conclusion, however, is intriguing and novel. 
They note that the emphasis within the disability rights community on 
"self-determination" may catch it in a contradiction when it then moves 
to oppose PAS. Rather than endorsing PAS, however, the authors re- 
read self-determination from the perspective of a disabled person. In 
the end they conclude unsurprisingly: 
In a country that does not guarantee access to health care or 
adequate support for dignified assisted living to all its citizens, 
disempowered populations may be more vulnerable to the pressure 
to request PAS and other forms of physician assistance in dying. 
People with abridged choices due to social devaluation and 
economic oppression who are offered death as an option may be 
more inclined to choose this path than patients with a number of 
options available to them, and this may include people who are 
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elderly, chronically ill, poor and disabled. (164) 
Feminist legal scholar Susan M. Wolf contributes an essay entitled 
Physician-Assisted Suicide, Abortion, and Treatment Refusal: Using 
Gender to Analyze the Difference. This is by far one of the strongest 
and most interesting articles in the volume from a legal perspective. 
Wolf offers reasons for considering gender relevant to the debate on 
physician-assisted suicide. She also carefully re-reads Planned 
Parenthood v Casey, 510 US 1309 (1994), and Cruzan v Director, 
Missouri Department of Health, 497 US 261 (1990), showing how their 
deployment by the lower courts in Quill v Vacco, Compassion in Dying 
v Washington, 122 F3d 1262 (9th Cir 1997), and then Washington v 
Glucksberg radically misread the precedent cases and in no way 
established a protected liberty interest that would ground a constitutional 
right to obtain assisted suicide. Her analysis is careful and insightful. 
Two interpretive points are key: (1) Cruzan and Casey concern a right to 
be free of the bodily invasions (unwanted treatment and pregnancy), not 
a right to be able to obtain an invasion in order to end one's life; (2) 
Cruzan and Casey establish an entitlement to live free, not an 
entitlement o surrender freedom through death. In Wolf s view, PAS, 
located in a history which valorizes women's self-sacrifice and 
encourages women's deaths, renders PAS "a fatal threat to women's 
equality." (170) She closes by reviewing countervailing state interests 
in opposing assisted suicide. 
The final section takes up Public Policy Options and 
Recommendations. An essay by Steven Miles, M.D., Demetra M. 
Pappas, J.D., and Robert Koepp analyzes three proposals: the Oregon 
Death with Dignity Act (Measure 16), the Rights of the Terminally Ill 
Bill of the Northern Territory of Australia (which took effect July 1, 
1996, and which was repealed shortly afterwards by the federal 
legislature of Australia, which may override territorial legislation), and 
that proposed by Franklin Miller, Timothy Quill, Howard Brody, John 
Fletcher, Larry Gostin, et al.4 This essay is equal in rigor, perceptivity, 
and importance to Wolf s. Reading these proposals against the 
historical landmarks of bioethics law and policy, their thesis is simple 
but compelling: that the safeguards designed to enhance respect for 
patient autonomy undermine two decades of the protection of patient 
autonomy, resurrect medical paternalism, and discriminate against 
minors, the incompetent, and disabled persons. 
Their arguments are extensive and complex. I will highlight only 
4. See Regulating Physician-Assisted Death, 331 New England J Med 119-24 (1994). 
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two of their points. At issue is whether or not PAS represents a 
fundamental right. If so, it should be made available to all patients, 
competent and incompetent, physically disabled and nondisabled. Yet, 
insofar as these proposals disallow "advance directed, substituted 
judgement, or best interest standards for decision making on behalf of 
decisionally incapable persons," (215) they discriminate unjustly against 
those who cannot articulate and/or carry out their own wishes. 
Moreover, they question physicians' new extrajudicial authority to deny 
this "treatment option" to legally competent patients because the patients 
give the wrong reasons or because they do not meet certain criteria: 
"These restrictions are novel in that the right to refuse life-sustaining 
treatment, or indeed to consent to (or refuse) any other medical 
treatment, is nowhere else contingent on terminal illness, proximity to 
death, or reversibility." (219) 
In the final essay William J. Winslade suggests two policy types 
that might be options in the current situation. The first entails "legally 
excusing" physicians who admit participation in PAS. Assisted suicide 
would remain illegal but physicians would be allowed to demonstrate 
that their action constituted a proper exception. The second policy route 
would be to "regulate a right to PAS." Although he appears to favor this 
proposal, he does not advance reasons for its adoption. 
This volume offers a valuable model of how to do historical, 
ethical, and legal analysis. Rather than simply being a collection of 
disjointed essays, the contributions artfully interact, so that arguments 
advanced by one author are addressed, refuted, and/or nuanced by 
others. 
Three important general observations about the PAS debate emerge 
from the confluence of these essays. First, although distinctions and 
notions of intention, motive, the relationship between cause and effect, 
the magnitude of effect, the balancing of individual good and the 
common good are central to law, PAS advocates seek to efface critical 
conceptual, moral, and legal distinctions. Second, although the impetus 
for PAS often seems simply to logically extend bioethics as it has 
developed over the past thirty years, the essays in this volume show how 
it would in fact be a radical departure from the tradition's wisdom. 
Third, reading from Vanderpool to Miles, it becomes clear that the issue 
of power remains a central issue: physicians feel disempowered when 
facing patient pain, suffering, and death; patients seek power and 
"control." Even the phrase "allowing to die" betrays the continuing 
fiction that power over death lies in medicine's hands. 
Finally, more attention needs to be paid to how public attitudes 
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toward and patient experiences of dying are socially constructed and 
how the practice and discourse coopts both physicians and patients into 
reproducing particular social values. Too often, physician, patient, or 
public surveys are invoked without attending to the social location of the 
population surveyed or to how these opinions have been shaped by 
social and economic forces. One might argue, for example, that claims 
that dying is a personal and private matter that individuals ought to 
control reflect contemporary trends toward commodification of human 
life; now even the "right to life" is seen as something one owns, 
property to be disposed of as one sees fit. This attitude of relatively 
recent vintage fits within a spectrum of like beliefs shaped in large part 
by the forces of a biotechnologically-driven market. 
In the end, this volume provides tools for interpreting continuing 
developments on the PAS front and stimulates the need for further 
analysis, whether it be Jack Kevorkian's recent conviction or Oregon's 
sobering decision authorizing Medicaid payments for PAS-for the 
poor. 
M. Therese Lysaught t 
t Assistant Professor, Department of Religious Studies, Dayton University, Dayton, Ohio. 
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